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negative order doctrine operates only to preclude attacks by statutory in-
junction.148
Conclusion. While control of appealability rests largely in the hands of
the courts, the influence which can be exercised by the legislative draftsman
is not inconsiderable. Statutes clearly can determine the stage at which orders
may be attacked. And since indiscriminate appeals are incompatible with
administrative efficiency, final orders from which appeals may be taken should
be specified in newly-enacted statutes. Legislative draftsmen who wish to
prevent appeals entirely may have a more difficult task. If the statute is
framed in terms of pure discretion, and if no provision is made for a hear-
ing, the chances of precluding appeals may be somewhat enhanced. Perhaps
a more sucessful method of limiting appeals would be to provide for review
under the terms of the Urgent Deficiencies Act; the negative order doctrine
might then be applied. And finally, appeals by parties other than those on
whom an order directly operates can probably be warded off by specific
provision denying private parties the right of appeal.
CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT OF INFORMATION REQUIRED
BY THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
THE DISCLoSUR provisions of the Securities Exchange Act' are an integral
portion of a statute which aims to provide investors with the data necessary
to formulate intelligent judgments as to the value of corporate securities.
In a simpler day, corporate capital was ordinarily derived from the sale of
stock to the entrepreneurs who managed the companies or to local investors
who could inform themselves directly about the companies' affairs.2 If those
persons were barred from information and had reasonable grounds for seek-
ing it, equity would give them access to books and papers.3 But this privilege
was not granted to bondholders or prospective investors, 4 and, though some-
148. In its most recent decision in the field, the Supreme Court has indicated by
way of dictum that the negative order doctrine operates only to preclude the special
type of review procedure of the Urgent Deficiencies Act. See United States v. Griffin,
58 Sup. Ct. 601, 607 (1938); Watkins, Has a Shipper Who Ha Been Denicd Relief
by the Interstate Commerce Commission Any Remedy? (1917) 17 CoL. L. REv. 34, 42.
Cf. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 311 (1913).
1. Securities Exchange Act §§ 12, 13, 48 STAT. 892, 894, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78(1), (m),
(1934).
2. 2 DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY oF AmERICAN CoRPORATiois (1917)
298-303.
3. Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905); Varney v. Baker, 194 Mass. 239,
80 N. E. 524 (1907) ; In re Steinway, 159 N. Y. 250, 53 N. E. 1103 (1889).
4. The privilege was limited strictly to actual stockholders. 5 FLETcumE, Con-




what extended by statutes,5 is of negligible value to the ten million-odd
"owners" of the modern corporation.6 Consequently, prior to the passage of
the Exchange Act and its counterpart, the Securities Act,' investors were
forced to appraise security values on the basis of voluntarily published cor-
porate reports,8 most of which were fragmentary even when regulated by the
various stock exchanges,9 and some of which served as a cloak for incompe-
tence and dishonesty.' 0
To remedy these evils the Exchange Act imposes upon all corporations
whose securities are listed on exchanges the standard of full disclosure which
the Securities Act requires of corporations floating new issues." As a pre-
requisite to listing its securities, a corporation must file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission and with the exchange an application including
its history, structure, officers and directors and their remuneration, balance
sheets, and profit and loss statements,'- all of which must be kept up to
date by periodical supplemental reports.1 3 The Act lists only the subjects
and persons about whom information must be given. The extent of disclosure
is left to the Commission, which is authorized to prescribe by rules and regu-
lations the detail "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
5. E.g., Shea v. Parker, 234 Mass. 592, 126 N. E. 47 (1920) (statute held to
grant absolute right of inspection of stock book); N. Y. STocn Conp. LAw § 77 (holder
of 3% of shares can require treasurer to furnish a sworn balance sheet irrespective
of reason).
6. In many large corporations, it is probable that no one person, outside of
management groups, ovns enough stock to exercise the power granted in N. Y. Srocx
CORP. LAw § 77, supra note 5. See BE.RE Axm MEANS, MoDEnW; Co ORATIOZN ANDm
PRIVATE PRoPERTY (1932) 47, 97-110.
7. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended 48 STAT. 905 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §77(a)
(1934).
8. Publication has not been voluntary in every instance. A Massachusetts statute
requires an annual report including a balance sheet independently audited. MAss. Gm.
LAws (1932) c. 156, §§ 47, 49. Carriers and utilities must report to various regulatory
bodies. See Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 819, 833-4.
9. See PipLxy, MA.x STrarun AND VALL ST=zr (1927), c. 6, 7; Farr, The Arnual
Corporate Report: A Study in Evasion (1934) 168 H~.npa's .AoAzrxuz 421. The
New York Stock Exchange made efforts to raise the level of reporting by its listing
requirements. TiwENTETH CEN-TmY FuxN, TnE SEcurnn iLmumrs (1935) 576, 592,
602. But enforcement often was lax. See id., at 584, n. 1; Smu. REP. No. 1455, 73d
Cong. 2d. Sess. (1934) 70.
10. See REms, FALSE SECURTY (1937); SN. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934) 55-73, 205-20.
11. Compare §12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act with Schedule A of the
Securities Act. Comparable forms are Form 10 under the Securities Exchange Act
[C. C. H. St. Exch. Reg. Serv. 16511], and Form A-2 under the Securities Act
[C. C. H. Securities Act Serv. 6651]. The issue of new securities of course requires
extensive disclosures unnecessary in Form 10. See hMacChesney and O'Brien, Full Dis-
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protection of investors."'1 4 Presumably, the precedent of the Securities Act
could have been followed, and these rules and regulations could be applied
without exception to all corporations seeking the privilege of listing.15 But
the Act provides two safeguards to avoid undue hardship in individual cases.
Section 24(a) permits a registrant to withhold entirely from the Commission
trade secrets and processes, and Section 24(b) provides that upon written
objection to the disclosure of any information, the Commission may hold a
hearing "where it deems it advisable" and may "make available to the public
the information . . .only when in its judgment a disclosure . . . is in the
public interest."' 16
Numerous objections to publication have been filed under Section 24(b), 17
and fifteen suits are pending in the Circuit Courts of Appeals contesting
denials of confidential treatment.1 8 Their disposition depends, first, upon an
interpretation of the statutory provisions and, second, upon a decision as
to the proper scope of judicial review of administrative action.
The statutory standards which guide the Commission in laying down
rules and in granting exemptions from the rules are not identical. For the
former the standard is "the public interest or the protection of investors ;"
for the latter, it is "the public interest" alone. This verbal difference, how-
ever, seems immaterial, for the public interest involved in these provisions
is the protection of investors. 19 But the considerations which lead to the
14. Section 12(b) (1); cf. § 13(b). Rules and regulations are not appealable but
may be enjoined if arbitrary or an unreasonable interpretation of the statute. Third
Ave. Ry. v. Securities Exchange Commission, 85 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936);
see BLACHLY AND OATMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION (1934)
c. 4.
15. The Securities Act provides for exemption from its disclosure requirements in
only one respect. Portions of material contracts may be withheld if the Commission
determines that disclosure would impair the value of the contract and is not necessary
for the protection of investors. Schedule A, 130, 48 STAT. 91 (1933), 15 US. C.
§ 77(aa) (1934). In the year ending June 30, 1937, 68 requests were made for con-
fidential treatment under Rule No. 580 [C. C. H. Securities Act Serv. 5580] which
embodies this exemption. Sixty-six were granted. S. E. C. TIRD ANNUAL REIonr
(1937) 63. Cf. Rule No. 581 [C. C. H. Securities Act Serm. f1 5581]. The Securities
Exchange Act does not require disclosure of material contracts, as described in Schedule
A, 24, of the Securities Act, except management and service contracts. § 12(b) (1) (G).
16. 48 STAT. 901, 15 U.S. C. § 78(x) (1934).
17. In the year ending June 30, 1936, 631 registrants objected to publication of
966 items of information, and 218 companies objected to disclosure of material in annual
reports. See S. E. C. SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1936) 25.
18. Thirty-one petitions for review have been filed, but sixteen have been volun-
tarily dismissed. See S. E. C. THImD ANNUAL Ru'oRT (1937) 179, giving circuit, date
of filing, and status of each.
19. SEN. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934) 10-11; H. R. REP. No. 1383,
73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934) 11-13. "The public interest," a valid guide for administra-
tive action, refers not to the public welfare generally but to the context and purpose
of the Act. New York Central Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 (1932);
Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtge. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 285 (1933).
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promulgation of general rules of disclosure are, of course, not always the
same as those involved in adjudicating a petition for exemption from a rule.
Although disclosure of a particular item may be in the interest of the invest-
ing public and may work no hardship on corporations generally, it may
cause injury to an individual corporation far outweighing the benefit con-
ferred on security holders by publicity. The treatment accorded salaries
and profit and loss statements illustrates the Commission's recognition of
this distinction.
The statute demands "such information as the Commission may require"
concerning the remuneration of officers and directors, and of others earning
more than $20,000 a year, together with "bonus and profit-sharing arrange-
ments."20 The share of corporate income which management takes for itself
would seem to be a legitimate concern of the investing public, especially in
view of the general suspicion in recent years that the proportion is often
exorbitant. 21 On the other hand, there is wide-spread opposition to indis-
criminate publication of individual salaries, such as the Revenue Act allows.=
It is argued that disclosure arouses intra-company jealousies among minor
executives. 23 The S. E. C., free to determine what serves the interest of
investors, has apparently accorded some weight to these claims since it requires
the individual salaries only of the directors and the three highest paid officers
of a company. For the other officers and employees earning more than
$20,000, an aggregate amount with the number to whom it is paid suffices.2 4
This interpretation of the general public interest seems reasonable. Appli-
cants for confidential treatment have, however, been dissatisfied even with
this compromise and have claimed that any interest in salaries is "criminal
curiosity"2 5 and that publicity will make the rank and file seeth with dis-
content.28 But these arguments are not very compelling, since they overlook
the fact that under the Revenue Act corporate salaries over $15,000 are
already widely publicized,2 7 and since they tend chiefly to deprecate the utility
of the information to the public at large-a factor presumably considered by
the Commission in promulgating its rules--rather than the requisite injury
20. §§ 12(b) (1) (D, E, F).
21. See Flynn, Wlt Should a Man Earn? (1933) 90 FoRun 3; Bah-er, Executike
Compensation Compared with Earnings (1936) 14 H.v. Bus. Rmv. 213.
22. See N. Y. Times, April 29, 1937, p. 20, col. 2; id., Jan. 11, 1933, p. 22, col. 2.
23. Hearings Before the Committee on Banking md Currency on S. Res. 84, 72d
Cong., and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, 73d Cong. (1934) p. 66S6 (Pecora Investigation).
24. Form 10, items 26 and 27. See [C. C. I. St. Fxch. Reg. Serv. §§ 6539, 6540].
25. Congoleunm-Nairn Petition for Review of denial of confidential treatment, as
quoted in N. Y. Times, March 27, 1936, p. 33, col. 8
26. See DixAmoND MATCH CouaN.&Y, REPor "To S mocomwrs Fort 1935 (1936)
172-4; National Biscuit Co. Petition for Review of denial of confidential treatment,
as quoted in N. Y. Times, March 27, 1936, p. 33, col. 8.
27. 48 STAT. 727, 26 U.S. C. § 148(d) (1934).
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to a particular applicant. The Commission has consequently had little occa-
Sion to grant confidential treatment to salary information.
2 8
A more stormy history has followed the Act's requirement of "profit and
loss statements." 29 The Commission's rules require, among others, four
highly important figures: (1) gross sales, (2) cost of goods sold, (3) depre-
ciation and depletion, and (4) selling, general, and administrative expenses.80
These items seem essential, purely as a matter of definition, to a complete
profit and loss statement.31 Though many so-called "income statements"
reveal only net earnings or gross profits, 32 most accountants and expert
analysts agree that a complete statement is invaluable in appraising a com-
pany's condition and prospects, especially the sales and cost of sales figures.33
While skepticism as to the individual investor's ability to analyze, them is
not unwarranted, the inability arises partly from unfamiliarity, and in any
event these figures can be effectively utilized by competent investment coun-
sel, financial manuals, and the financial press.3 4 The most determined oppo-
sition arises from business men who traditionally feel that their volume and
costs canfiot be revealed even in the unanalyzed form required by the Com-
mission without inviting disaster. But' many large corporations have long
published them as a matter of course,35 and no cases have been found of
untoward results directly attributable to compliance with the Act. 30
While the rules requiring these four figures also seem reasonable, the
problem of exemption is more difficult. All fifteen of the pending suits are
28. See statement by then Chairman Landis, N. Y. Times, April 14, 1937, p. 46,
col. 1.
29. § 12(b) (1) (J).
30. Instruction Book for Form 10. [C. C. H. St. Exch. Reg. Serv. 16567].
31. See FEDERAL REsERVE BOARD, VERIFICATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (Rev.
ed. 1929) 21, 26; KEsTER, ADVANCED ACCOUNTING (1933) C. 3; MACFARLAND AND
AYARS, AcCOUNTING FUNDAMENTALS (1936) c. 4; PATON, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOKI
(1934) 22-64.
32. For a survey of the wide variations in published profit and loss statements,
see Sunley, Seen in Published Financial Statements (1935) 15 CERTIFIED PUBIC Ac-
COUNTANT 682.
33. Then Chairman Landis characterized sales and cost of sales as the "most im-'
portant" figures in the applications. N. Y. Times, April 14, 1937, p. 46, col. 1. See
Robinson, Are Present Forms of Financial Statements Satisfactory? 62 JOURNAL OF
AccouNTANCY (Dec. 1936) 3, 11, 22; Examination of Financial Statements, BULLETIN
OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS (Jan. 1936) 3-4. But cf. Sanders,
Accounting Aspects of the Securities Act (1937) 4 LAW AND CONT. PROn. 191, 212.
34. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECUITY MARKErs (1935) c. 16.
35. In 1927, 235 out of 545 leading industrial corporations published gross income.
SLOAN, CORPORATION PROFITS (1929) 62. For examples of apparently irrational diver-
gences within industries, see TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITY MARKETS
(1935) 581.
36. See Sanders. Corporate Information Required by Federal Security Legislation
5 N. Y. CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT (April, 1935) 20.
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fighting disclosure of sales and cost of sales figures.37 And although the
petitioners have advanced varied arguments, two type situations indicate
circumstances in which confidential treatment may well be in the public in-
terest.3 s In the first, a relatively small company, most of whose output is
sold to one large buyer, will attempt to show that publication of its margin
of profit will give that buyer an additional lever with which to demand
lower prices. Second, companies whose competitors need not disclose their
margins of profit because they are not listed on any exchange may contend
that the latter will acquire various competitive advantages, such as an oppor-
tunity to persuade buyers that the registrant's margin of profit, which has
become a matter of public record, is excessive. To these arguments economists
may reply that buyers are swayed by the prices that sellers offer, not by their
margins of profit, while proponents of publicity may add that if a company
is in a vulnerable position, investors should know about it.39 For some
time, however, the Commission granted confidential treatment rather freely
in these type situations. But when investigations revealed that in many cases
competitors or customers already had obtained the disputed information
either through underhand activities' 0 or from other public records,41 and
that the figures had little effect upon buying policies,42 the number of ex-
emptions decreased.4 3
These instances show the conflicting interests involved in deciding whether
a particular disclosure is in the public interest. In each case the Commission
37. Communication to YALE LAW JouRNAL from Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, Oct. 28, 1937.
38. See Morrison, Reports to Stockholders (1935) 10 AccoinnixoT Rvi," 77,
81-3.
39. See ibid.; Pecora Investigation, supra note 23, at 6533.
40. On the prevalence of industrial espionage, see Pecora Investigation, supra note
23, at 6533; 78 CONG. Rmc 8184 (1934). Legitimate exchange of information through
trade associations, and illegitimate monopolistic activities, probably provide far more
competitive enlightenment than the figures whose public distribution is protested. Cf.
BuRis, T : DECLINE OF COMPETMON (1936) cc. 2, 10.
41. E.g., from franchise tax reports in Georgia, income tax returns in Wisconsin,
and reports under blue-sky laws in Michigan. Communication to the YAI. LAw
JouNMAL from Securities and Exchange Commission, Feb. 1, 1938.
42. See N. Y. World-Telegram, Jan. 11, 1938, p. 24, col. 2, summarizing the findings
of a special investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
43. Compare the figures in S. E. C. SECOND ANNUAL REoRT (1936) 25, with those
in S. E. C. TnRD ANNUAL REPORT (1937) 62. Statistical tabulation is impractical
because of the number of applications carried over from one year to the next. It is
clear, however, that both applications for, and grants of, confidential treatment have
sharply declined. Examination of S. E. C. releases on this subject for the past year
indicates that denials of confidential treatment are practically a matter of course. A
shift of policy is also suggested by the repeal, in Feb. 1937, of a rule by which grants
of confidential treatment under §24(b) could be extended to Securities Act filings by
the same company. Securities Act Release No. 1292 [C. C. H. Securities Act Serv.
p. 1492(n) ].
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must balance extravagant forebodings of disaster against the vague yet force-
ful mandate of the Act. The weight to be ascribed to either is scarcely
measurable. Consequently a solution of the question of whether harm is
threatened and, if so, whether it outveighs the interest of the investing public,
depends more upon an exercise of business judgment than upon an analysis
of evidence. For this reason it would seem advisable to leave this question
to the Commission's discretion and to permit no appeals. 44 This seems to
have been Congress' intent, for it rejected an amendment granting a right
to a hearing, which is ordinarily a prerequisite to an appeal,4 6 and provided
that a hearing was to be discretionary. 46 But the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals recently refused to accept this interpretation of the Act.47
Instead, it held that all denials of confidential treatment are appealable and
that the language granting hearings in the Commission's discretion meant
only that a hearing might be eliminated when confidential treatment was
granted, in which case the improbability of an appeal would render a hearing
unnecessary.4 1
To justify its conclusion the court accepted allegations that the sales figures
were trade secrets and therefore "property" as true, and to avoid constitu-
tional doubts felt constrained to declare that the Commission's decision was
"judicial" and consequently subject to review. But there are several objec-
tions to this line of reasoning which the court did not consider. In the
first place, there is little reason to classify sales figures as trade secrets, for
trade secrets are generally said to be processes and formulae rather than the
mere privacy with which an ordinary business is conducted. 40 Secondly, if
44. In analogous situations, an exercise of discretionary power has been held not
subject to appeal, and no constitutional objections have been found. Cf. Williamsport
Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551 (1928) (refusal to grant special tax
exemption); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503 (1902); Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. v. Lambert Run Coal Co., 267 Fed. 776 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920) (exemption
from general rule); Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282 (1912);
2 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1931) 406-17 (negative orders).
45. Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 766, at 778 et seq.
46. Section 24 first appears in its present form in H. R. 9323, § 23. In conference
the Senate attempted to substitute S.3420, §23 of which gave every objector a right
to a hearing. The C6mmittee report on S.3420 said the determination would be subject
to review. SEN. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934) 10. But the House provision
was adopted, the Conference report explaining, "that any person . . . might make
written objection to disclosure . . . , and the Commission was authorized to hear
objections if it deemed it advisable, but in any case the Commission might make the
information public despite objection if in its judgment the disclosure was in the public
interest." (Italics supplied) H. R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 37.
47. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
93 F. (2d) 236 (App. D. C. 1937).
48. A stockholder desiring to intervene and oppose a grant of confidential treatment
might possibly be able to appeal. See Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 766, 781.
49. In re Bolster, 59 Wash. 655, 110 Pac. 547 (1910); United States ex rcl, Nor-
wegian Nitrogen Products Co., Inc. v. Tariff Commission, 6 F. (2d) 491 (App, D, C
[VCol. 47: 790
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sales figures are actually to be considered trade secrets for the purposes of
this Act, the petitioners' right to appeal appears dubious at best. Since they
could withhold trade secrets from the Commission under Section 24(a), it
would seem that their proper administrative remedy was to do so, thus
requiring the Commission to take action,r0 rather than to submit the informa-
tion and then demand confidential treatment under Section 24(b).
Not only does the court's decision fail to answer these arguments r' but
its implications in terms of administrative efficiency seem unfortunate. Re-
calcitrant registrants may easily employ the machinery of appeal to delay
publication of reports until they possess only an historical interest.Y2 Although
the reviewing court has the power to refuse a stay of disclosure,0 most
courts will probably hesitate to exercise it, for publication would render the
question of confidential treatrhent moot. Another source of delay resulting
from the creation of the privilege to appeal denials of confidential treatment
is that the Commission, on request, will now have to precede such orders
by a hearing. Furthermore, this necessity of a hearing will impose a con-
siderable burden on the Commission not only by increasing the number of
hearings, but also by forcing the Commission itself, since no adversary in-
terests are involved, to produce evidence with which to make a record and
sustain its findings. 4 The difficulties involved in producing evidence which
will sustain a finding that disclosure is in the public interest are not to be
1925); see Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 238 U. S. 294, 325
(1933). Cf. Comment (1919) 19 Cor- L. RL-. 233; (1928) 42 HAxv. L. Rmn. 254,
50. The Commission would then apply to a district court for a writ of mandamus,
under §21(f), or proceed by hearing to suspend the registration, under §19(a)(2).
51. The decision was perhaps influenced by the fact that the Commission's Rule
UB2, [C. C. H. St. Exch. Reg. Serv. 5402], provided in detail for appeals. The
Commission insisted, however, that the procedure was established merely to facilitate
a court test of the question of appealability. Reply Brief for Respondent, p. 20, American
Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 93 F. (2d) 236 (App.
D. C. 1937).
52. Annual reports are ordinarily published two or three months after the close
of the business year. TwEm-rl-H CENruRY FuND, Tn- SE.cuiTy '.Amrs (1935)
591. On the average, the pending appeals were filed almost two years ago. See list
in S. E. C. Tinnm AwNuAL REPorr (1937) 179.
53. § 25(b).
54. See Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Administrative Law (1938)
47 YALE L. J. 647, 665, for a survey of the confused state of the law on findings. The
Commission must assuredly make a "basic" finding that the disclosure is in the public
interest. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 293 U. S. 454 (1935). But whether
subsidiary findings would be required is doubtful. Compare Louisiana v. United States,
290 U. S. 70 (1933), with Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States, 295 U. S. 193
(1935). If they were, the Commission might be somewhat embarrassed in the pending
appeals, for its orders denying confidential treatment merely recited that the informa-
tion was found to be in the public interest. See Petition for Review, p. 12, American
Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 93 F. (2d) 236 (App.
D. C. 1937).
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minimized,5 5 especially in view of the highly dramatic form in which objec-
tions may be presented.5 6 Some considerations may be difficult of proof, as,
for example, a belief of the Commission that the disputed figures are already
current among the objector's competitors as a result of underhand activities
within the industry. Others are scarcely matters of fact at all. Thus the
existence of public interest in full disclosure, which is largely a question of
policy, can be translated into evidence only by such colorless devices as
quotations from congressional reports and learned authors, methods which
would grow less colorful as they were perforce repeated in every record. 7
In these circumstances, it might be well to create a presumption of public
interest in any item required by the Commission's rules and to place some-
thing akin to the burden of proof upon anyone demanding confidential treat-
ment. The language of the Act may seem to stand in the way, for Section
24(b) permits disclosure, once objections have been raised, only when in the
Commission's judgment it is in the public interest. But the position of the
word only does not place any burden of proof on the Commission, for its
findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence." It may pos-
sibly make the Commission less hesitant to grant confidential treatment.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the purpose of the Act is to make publicity
the norm and confidential treatment the exception.
55. See Landis, Business Policy and the Courts (1938) 27 YALE RzMvw 235, 247-8,
summarizing the factors to be considered and the sources of information to be utilized
in these cases. But see FRFUND, AD ,iSTRATVE PowEas OVER PaSONS AND PROPERTY
(1928) 108.
56. One objector declared that its "very existence would be jeopardized" by dis-
closure. It has since dismissed its appeal. P. Lorillard Co. Petition for Review of
denial of confidential treatment, as quoted in N. Y. Times, March 27, 1936, p. 33,
col. 8; see N. Y. Times, April 14, 1937, p. 46, col. 1.
57. It would presumably be necessary to introduce this material at every hearing.
Cf. United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry., 265 U. S. 274 (1924).
58. § 25(a).
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